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TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW: WHETHER CATHOLIC
INSTITUTIONS ARE OBLIGATED UNDER TITLE VII TO
COVER THEIR EMPLOYEES' PRESCRIPTION
CONTRACEPTIVES
CRAIG W. MANDELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, many employers around the United States
have felt an ever-increasing push by their employees to adopt group
health plans that would provide coverage for prescription birth control.
The exclusion of such birth control on health plans went largely
unnoticed for years, and it wasn't until a significant number of
insurance plans decided to cover male "potency drugs" in the mid-
1990s that interest groups became inspired to fight for female
contraceptive coverage.' It was not long before state legislatures
responded favorably to this movement by enacting laws that required
the inclusion of contraceptive drugs and devices in all comprehensive
prescription drug plans.2 In the past ten years, over twenty-six states
passed bills requiring insurance providers to cover prescription birth
control .
However, state laws cannot regulate self-funded insurance
plans:4 plans under which the employer, not an insurance company,
bears the medical costs for participants. 5 Self-funded plans are
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law (2007); B.A., University of Wisconsin - Madison
(2004). Craig William Mandell practices commercial litigation at the Chicago law firm
Hinkhouse Williams Walsh LLP. www.hww-law.com. The views and opinions expressed
herein are those of the author and not those of Hinkhouse Williams Walsh LLP.
1. See Sandra Jordan & Roger Rathman, Planned Parenthood Urges Congress to Make
Contraceptive Coverage a Reality This Year, COMMON DREAMS NEWS WIRE (June 8, 1999),
http://www.commondreams.org/pressreleases/june99/060899c.htm ("The FDA approval of
Viagra and its almost instantaneous insurance coverage exposed the discrimination women
face from insurers.").
2. Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying
Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 741, 741 (2005).
3. See Fair Access to Contraception Project, Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. &
Planned Parenthood of W. Wash., Cover My Pills, http://www.covermypills.org/facts (follow
"State Law" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Cover My Pills].
4. The terms "self-funded" and "self-insured" will be used interchangeably throughout
this Article.
5. Jill Alesch, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An End to Discrimination Against
HIV/AIDS Patients or Simply Another Loophole to Bypass?, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 523, 527
(2004). State laws can, however, regulate fully insured plans such as those offered by Health
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governed exclusively by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), which preempts state law. 6 Self-funded plans are, thus,
only subject to federal law. Despite this preemption issue, employees
have found a way to challenge self-funded insurance plans that
selectively exclude prescription birth control from coverage.
8
Specifically, employees have successfully argued that the selective
exclusion of prescription birth control from an otherwise
comprehensive prescription drug plan discriminates against women
"affected by pregnancy" 9 in violation of Title VII.10
This recent legal trend is generally recognized as a positive
step in the direction of gender equality. However, the courts have not
yet addressed how this issue affects self-insured religious institutions
opposed to prescription birth control use.11 Many Catholic institutions
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). Id. Under such plans, an employer pays a premium to an
insurance provider who, in exchange, assumes the risk of providing all of the medical
coverage. Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining
the Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 233, 234 (1997).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (stating that ERISA applies to any
"employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained-by any employer engaged in ... any
industry or activity affecting commerce .. "); 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(1-3) (LexisNexis 2006)
(defining "employee benefit plan" as an "employee welfare benefit plan" which is "established
or maintained by an employer .... ).
7. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), 1191 (2000).
This Article is only concerned with self-insured plans for two reasons. First, more Catholic
institutions will be affected by a federal contraceptive coverage mandate. Such a requirement
would not only be enforced nationwide, but would also require all self-insured Catholic
institutes to be directly responsible for all birth control payments. Second, many state
contraceptive coverage laws include a "conscience clause," which exempts religious
institutions. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2008). Such an
exemption is currently not included in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (2000).
8. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73
WASH. L. REV. 363 (1998). But see Stabile, supra note 2, at 767-72 (arguing that Professor
Law provided "no real claim that coverage of contraceptives is necessary to promote equal
treatment of women").
9. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 200e(k) (2000).
10. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2001);
U.S. E.E.O.C. Decision, Dec. 14, 2000, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html. But see Cummins v. Ill., No.
2002-cv-4201-JPG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634 (S. D. III. Aug. 30, 2005) (holding an
employee health plan does not violate Title V1I if both men and women are denied
contraceptive coverage). Cummins is the only decision with this holding. Id.
11. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 73 (Cal.
2004) (raising the issue of how prescriptive drug plans in violation of Title VII affect self-
insured religious institutions opposed to prescription birth control use). In Catholic Charities,
a Catholic social services organization brought an action under the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions, against the State, seeking a
declaratory judgment that California's Women's Contraceptive Equity Act (WCEA) was
unconstitutional. Id. The WCEA imposed a general requirement that all employers offering
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currently do not cover their employees' prescription contraceptives
because of the Catholic Church's long and adamant stance that such
birth control is "intrinsically evil."' 12 Universal application of the Title
VII contraceptive coverage mandate would compel these Catholic
institutions to choose between adherence to the laws of the Church and
the laws of the State. Such an application of Title VII would be an
alarming step towards the enactment of laws, which offend the
integrity and autonomy of all religious institutions.
Therefore, as this legal trend progresses, one crucial question
must be answered: Should self-insured Catholic institutions be exempt
from any Title VII contraceptive coverage mandate?' 3 This Article
examines this question and, in doing so, ultimately posits that, in light
of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
insurance coverage for prescription drugs must provide coverage for prescription
contraceptives. Id. at 74. The California Superior Court upheld the WCEA despite the
substantial burden the law imposed on the Catholic employer. Id. The court reasoned that the
WCEA did not unconstitutionally infringe on the employer's First Amendment free exercise
right because it was a neutral and generally applicable law under the U.S. Supreme Court's
Smith Standard. See id at 84; see also infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text. However, this
decision is not applicable to the issues discussed in this Article because this Article is only
concerned with self-insured plans. Unlike the fully-insured plans at issue in Catholic
Charities, self-insured plans fall under ERISA which preempts state laws. See supra notes 6-7
and accompanying text. Therefore, a contraceptive coverage mandate which conflicts with a
religious employer's self-insured plan must conform to the more stringent standard set forth
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and not the Smith-standard used by the
California Supreme Court in Catholic Charities. See infra notes 87-105 and accompanying
text.
12. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2370 (1994) ("[E]very action which,
whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment or in the development of
its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation
impossible' is intrinsically evil.") (quoting PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE § 14 (July 25, 1968)).
The Church's antipathy towards birth control dates back to the fifth century when Augustine
of Hippo wrote that marriage is a legal contract designed specifically for procreation. See St.
Augustine of Hippo Sermons on Selected Lessons of the New Testament, Benedictine Edition,
Sermon 1, § 22, available at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/160301.htm (last visited Oct.
1, 2008). The Church's modem position against contraceptives was largely influenced by the
publication of Casti Connubii by Pope Pius Xl's, which became the Church's official marriage
document until 1968. See ROBERT MCCLORY, TURNING POINT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
PAPAL BIRTH CONTROL COMMISSION, AND How HUMANE VITAE CHANGED THE LIFE OF PATTY
CROWLEY AND THE FUTURE OF THE CHURCH 22 (1995). It stated that "any use whatsoever of
matrimony exercised in such a way that the act [of sexual intercourse] is deliberately frustrated
in its natural power to generate life is an offense against the law of God ... and those who
indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin." Pope Pius XI, Casti Connubii § 56
(Dec. 31, 1930), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/
pius.xi/encyclicals/documents/hf p-xi-enc_31121930_casti-connubii en.html.
13. The "PDA contraceptive coverage mandate" and the "Title VII contraceptive
coverage mandate" are often use interchangeably in legal decisions and scholarly articles. So
too will they be used interchangeably in this Article as they refer to the same law.
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Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal 14 [hereinafter 0 Centro], Catholic
employers should be exempt from Title VII's contraceptive coverage
mandate because the mandate substantially burdens such employers'
free exercise rights in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA).
Part II proffers background on the recent legal trend supporting
mandatory contraceptive coverage.15 Part II also briefly explains the
relevant history behind our current free exercise jurisprudence.' 6
Part III examines the tension that resulted from the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 17 and how the Court largely
resolved this tension by affirming RFRA's application to federal law
in 0 Centro.18 Part III also analyzes the likelihood that Catholic
institutions can earn an exemption from Title VII's contraceptive
coverage mandate by raising a successful RFRA claim. 19
Part IV illustrates the benefits of exempting Catholic
institutions from Title VII's contraceptive coverage mandate.
Specifically, Part IV demonstrates (1) the policy benefits of exempting
Catholic institutions from the contraceptive coverage mandate; 2and
(2) how such an exemption does not prevent Title VII from
accomplishing its legislative purpose.
2
'
II. BACKGROUND
Although the legal trend toward instituting mandatory
contraceptive coverage is in its early stages, the principle guiding this
trend dates back at least thirty years-when Congress amended Title
VII by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).2 This
section briefly illustrates the legal history behind the PDA's formation
and its role in recent decisions compelling private employers to cover
contraceptives in their health plans. This section also proffers
background on Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence by examining its
14. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
15. See infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 49-101 and accompanying text.
17. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
18. See infra notes 102-197 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 199-242 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 244-252 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 254-260 and accompanying text.
22. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2000)).
202
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legal history from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v.
Verner, 23 to its recent 2005 decision in 0 Centro.
24
A. Evolution of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Title VII was enacted in 196425 with the goal of ending
"discrimination in employment and to place all men and women,
regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin, on equal footing
in how they were treated in the workforce. ' 26 To this end, Title VII
states, in pertinent part, "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer.., to discriminate against any individual.., because
of such individual's ... sex., 27 In 1978, Congress amended Title VII
by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which defihed
discrimination "on the basis of sex" to include discrimination "because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy."28
Congress passed the PDA in response to29 the Supreme Court's
decision in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert.30 In Gilbert, the Court held
that an employer's selective exclusion of benefits for pregnancy-
related disabilities did not constitute discrimination "because
of... sex" 31 under Title VII. 32 Justices Brennan and Stevens sharply
23. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24. 546 U.S. 418 (2005).
25. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2000)).
26. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
Ironically, Title VII opponents added "sex" to the bill hoping that the additional term would
make the proposed Act too controversial, and thus, defeat it. See Mark Musson, Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace: The Time Has Come for All Offenders to Personally Suffer the
Consequences of Their Actions, 64 UMKC L. REV. 237 (1996).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
28. Id. at § 2000e(k) (emphasis added). In 1993, Congress enacted the Family and
Medical Leave Act which extended the PDA's protections by granting eligible employees up
to twelve weeks of unpaid leave during any twelve month period for one of the following four
issues: (1) the birth of, and care for, a newbom; (2) the placement of a foster or adopted child
in the employee's home; (3) care for a nuclear family member who is seriously ill; or (4) the
employee's own serious illness. Susan A. Kidwell, Pregnancy Discrimination in Educational
Institutions: A Proposal to Amend the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1287, 1298-99 (2001).
29. Kidwell, supra note 28, at 1293.
30. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
32. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
When Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate... because of... sex... ," without further explanation of
its meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant something different
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dissented from this conclusion, arguing that "it offends common sense
to suggest that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at
the minimum, strongly 'sex related.' 33 The U.S. Supreme Court has
since recognized that the PDA's enactment demonstrates that Congress
viewed the dissenting opinions in Gilbert as more reflective of the
principles behind Title VII.
34
B. Emergence of the PDA 's Contraceptive Coverage Requirement
In the late 1990s, legal scholars and women's rights groups
began to question whether the PDA could be used to require
employers to provide insurance coverage for prescription
contraceptives.35 Although the exact origin of this debate is unclear,
many argue that it began as a direct result of the increased health
insurance coverage for Viagra and other male potency drugs.
36
Regardless of its origins, the debate has gained considerable
momentum over the past few years due to a number of significant
rulings in favor of mandatory contraceptive coverage.
37
In 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) ruled that employers who exclude contraceptives from
prescription health plans discriminate along gender lines in violation
of Title VI-as amended by the PDA. Although the EEOC's
from what the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant .... We
therefore agree with petitioner that its disability-benefits plan does not
violate Title VII because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related
disabilities.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).
33. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678
(1983) ("When Congress amended Title VII in 1978 [by enacting the PDA], it unambiguously
expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert
decision."); see also In re Union Pac. R.R. Empl. Practices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143
(D. Neb. 2005).
35. See, e.g., Law, supra note 8, at 364-68 (discussing how impediments to
contraceptives contribute to unintended pregnancies, which, in turn, can result in harmful
consequences for women, infants, and society).
36. Stabile, supra note 2, at 770 (arguing that there is no validity to the claim that
contraceptive coverage is necessary to promote equal treatment of women because the Viagra
coverage is not analogous to the contraceptive coverage); see also Carey Goldberg, Insurance
for Viagra Spurs Coverage for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1999, at Al (discussing
the link between Viagra coverage and the demand for contraceptive coverage).
37. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
38. U.S. E.E.O.C., Decision, Dec. 14, 2000, available at
http ://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html ("However, prescription
contraceptives are available only for women. As a result, Respondents' explicit refusal to offer
insurance coverage for them is, by definition, a sex-based exclusion.").
2008] TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW
decisions are not binding on federal courts, its decisions are highly
persuasive because it is the administrative body responsible for Title
VII enforcement. 39 This EEOC decision constituted a major turning
point in the contraceptive coverage debate and inspired female
employees around the country to file Title VII claims against their
employers, demanding that their prescription health plans comply with
the new EEOC policy.4 0
Less than a year after the EEOC decision,41 a federal court
addressed the issue for the first time in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.42
In Erickson, an employer was sued for rejecting coverage of birth
control for non-union employees in its Prescription Benefit Plan.43 The
Erickson court agreed with the EEOC, and held that the employer's
prescription drug plan discriminated because of sex in violation of the
PDA. 44  The court concluded that when an employer decides to
selectively exclude drugs from an otherwise comprehensive
prescription drug plan, "it has a legal obligation to make sure that the
resulting plan does not discriminate based on sex-based characteristics
and that it provides equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes."45
The Erickson decision generated considerable publicity 46 and initiated
a legal trend that quickly gained momentum across the country.47
39. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) ("[T]hc well-reasoned views
of the agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."') (quoting Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486
U.S. 107, 115 (1988) ("The EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary
enforcement responsibility... need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference."); In re
Union Pacific, 378 F. Supp.2d at 1143 ("The EEOC's policy is not binding on this Court, but
is entitled to some deference, because the EEOC is the administrative body responsible for
enforcement of Title VII and the PDA."); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, 514 F.2d 651, 653
(8th Cir. 1975) ("Regulations issued by the [EEOC] in furtherance of [Title VII] are entitled to
great deference by the courts.").
40. See infra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Cover My Pills, supra note 3
(follow "State Law" hyperlink).
41. U.S. E.E.O.C., Decision, Dec. 14, 2000, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/decision-contraception.html.
42. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
43. Id. at 1268.
44. Id. at 1272 ("In light of the fact that prescription contraceptives are used only by
women, Bartell's choice to exclude that particular benefit from its generally applicable benefit
plan is discriminatory").
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Lisa Girion, Judge Orders Coverage of Birth Control, L.A. TIMES, June
13, 2001, at Al; Sarah Schafer, Judge Orders Firm to Cover Birth Control, WASH. POST, June
13, 2001, at El.
47. See Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 223 F.R.D. 522 (D. Mo. 2004) (stating that an
employee sought injunctive relief against her employer's restricted coverage for prescribed
206 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 8:199
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address whether Catholic
institutions should be exempt from the PDA due to the Catholic
Church's moral objection to prescription contraceptive use.4 8
However, since the Erickson decision, a large number of new Title VII
claims have surfaced-many of which are targeted at Catholic
institutions.
C. The Free Exercise Clause from Sherbert to Lukumi
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof"4 9 Although free exercise claims are often brought
against laws that intentionally discriminate against religion, 50 most
claims seek exemption from facially neutral laws that, nevertheless,
indirectly compel individuals to act against their religious beliefs.5
In the 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner, the U.S. Supreme Court
set forth what would ultimately become the standard for free exercise
jurisprudence for almost thirty years. 52 In Sherbert, the claimant was
contraceptives to mail-order acquisition); Cooley v. DaimerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d
979, 981 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding that the employer's exclusion of prescription
contraceptives from its employee health care plan had a disparate impact on women and, thus,
constituted gender discrimination in violation of Title VII); Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2002
WL 2022334, *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2002) (holding that the employer discriminated against
women by refusing to provide health insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives). But
see In re Union Pacific R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007)
(reversing the trial court's decision that the PDA required the defendant employer to cover its
employees contraceptives stating that "the PDA does not require coverage of contraception
because contraception is not 'related to' pregnancy for PDA purposes and is gender-neutral.").
48. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 76 (Cal.
2004) (addressing this contraceptive coverage issue, as it applies to state law). The Court
upheld the state law, finding that the statute did not impermissibly interfere with the
employer's autonomy and that the statute's conscience clause did not purposefully exclude
Catholic institutions. See id. at 76-79. The Court also held that the statute was not subject to
strict scrutiny because it was a neutral law of general applicability, as defined by Smith. See id.
at 82-84; accord Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, No. 110 (N.Y. Oct. 19,
2006) (upholding the application of a state contraceptive coverage mandate over an
employer's free exercise claim because the employer's primary focus was not the inculcation
of religious values). See generally Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 520
(1993);
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1477 (13th ed. 2004).
52. 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). Although this is the earliest U.S. Supreme Court decision
that is pertinent to this Article, the Court's first major decision concerning free exercise
exemptions was Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the application of a federal anti-polygamy law to a Mormon who claimed that
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denied unemployment compensation because she refused to accept any
employment that required her to work on Saturdays. 53 The claimant
was a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, which considers
it a sin to work on Sundays. 54 Consequently, the plaintiff argued that
the denial of these benefits violated her right to freely exercise her
religious beliefs." The Supreme Court held in favor of the claimant,
declaring that any law which burdens the free exercise of religion,
directly or indirectly, must be (1) justified by a "compelling State
interest" and (2) narrowly tailored to satisfy that interest. 5
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith,57 the Supreme Court abandoned the Sherbert
balancing test 58 and stated that the Free Exercise Clause does not
require exemptions from "neutral law[s] of general applicability." 59 In
Smith, the claimants were fired for ingesting peyote for sacramental
purposes.60 Moreover, since peyote ingestion was criminal under
Oregon law, the claimants' actions constituted work-related
polygamy was his religious duty. Id. at 164-66. The Court held that while the Free Exercise
Clause forbids laws that infringe on an individual's religious beliefs, its protection does not
extend to religious conduct. Id. at 166. To exempt religious conduct from criminal laws, the
Court argued, "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." Id. at 167.
Reynolds was overruled sixty years later in Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940) ("Thus the [First] Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and
freedom to act.").
Another significant decision, prior to Sherbert, concerning the Free Exercise Clause is
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld, the Court rejected a free exercise
challenge to a local ordinance which required all businesses to be closed on Sundays. Id. at
601. Orthodox Jews argued that the Sunday closing law substantially hindered their ability to
compete with other businesses since their religion already required them to not work on
Saturdays. Id. at 602. The Court held that a statute that only indirectly burdens religiously
motivated conduct does not violate the Free Exercise Clause unless the State can accomplish
its purpose by means which do not create such a burden. Id. at 606-07. This standard was later
modified in Sherbert where the Court held that all laws which burden religion, regardless of
whether that burden was direct or indirect, must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
State interest. See Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
53. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-01.
54. Id. at399n.1.
55. Id. at 399-400.
56. Id. at 406 (defining the standard that is generally referred to as the Sherbert
balancing test).
57. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
58. Id. at 885 ("We conclude today that the sounder approach.., is to hold the
[Sherbert balancing] test inapplicable to ... challenges... [concerning neutral] generally
applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct ....").
59. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
60. Id. at 874.
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"misconduct" and, thus, disqualified them from unemployment
compensation. 6 1 The Supreme Court held that the State's denial of
compensation did not infringe on the claimants' free exercise rights
because the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual from
his obligation to comply with "neutral law[s] of general
applicability., 62 The Court argued that allowing exemptions from such
laws would deny states the ability to effectively regulate socially
harmful conduct and allow each man to "become a law unto
himself. ,
63
The majority in Smith met sharp criticism from the other
Justices. Although Justice O'Connor concurred with the decision, she
would not join the majority, stating that its analysis "dramatically
departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears
unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible
with our Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious
liberty., 64 Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's departure from
the Sherbert standard,65 arguing that the First Amendment bars
Congress from passing any law that burdens an individual's free
exercise of religion, regardless of whether that burden is direct or
indirect. 66 Therefore, according to Justice O'Connor, any law that
prohibits religiously motivated conduct raises First Amendment
concerns, regardless of whether such law is generally applicable.
67
Additionally, Justice Blackmun-joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall-dissented, hinting that the majority's opinion represented
nothing more than dangerous judicial activism in that, to achieve its
own political ends in the war on drugs, the majority mischaracterized
61. Id.
62. Id. at 879, 890.
63. Id. at 885. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
64. Id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
66. Smith, 494 U.S. at 895 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
(T]he essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden imposed by
government on religious practices ... whether the burden is imposed
directly ... or indirectly through laws that, in effect, make abandonment
of one's own religion ... the price of an equal place in the civil
community.
Id. at 897.
67. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The First Amendment... [does] not distinguish
between laws that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious practices."
Id. at 894.
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Supreme Court precedent by "overturning. .. settled law concerning
the Religion Clauses of our Constitution."
The Supreme Court eventually incorporated both the Smith
69
and Sherbert70 rules into a new, two-part test for analyzing free
exercise claims in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah.7' In Lukumi, the Court declared that a law violates the Free
Exercise Clause if it (1) is not neutral and generally applicable as
defined in Smith; and (2) is not narrowly tailored to further a
compelling State interest, as defined in Sherbert.72 The Smith rule
73
clearly dominates the Lukumi standard since a court must first find that
a law fails the Smith rule before analyzing that law according to the
Sherbert compelling interest test.
The Lukumi decision also illustrated the deep divide that
continued to exist between the Supreme Court Justices concerning the
Smith rule.74 For example, Justice Blackmun flatly stated in his
concurring opinion in Lukumi: "I continue to believe that Smith was
wrongly decided. 75 Justice O'Connor joined Blackman in his
concurrence.
76
Justice Souter did not take part in the Smith decision, but wrote
one of the more intriguing concurring opinions in Lukumi, stating that
the Smith rule was "decidedly untypical of the cases involving the
same type of law." 77 He explained that Smith was the first decision to
require proof that the Legislature used religion as a standard for action
or inaction (i.e., proof of a discriminatory intent on part of the
Legislature) to invalidate a law under the Free Exercise Clause.78
68. See id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("One hopes that the Court is aware of the
consequences, and that its result is not a product of overreaction to the serious problems the
country's drug crisis has generated.").
69. Id. at 881-82 (holding that all neutral laws of general applicability are exempt from
First Amendment scrutiny).
70. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
71. 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993).
72. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32; Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
The Supreme Court held in Lukumi that the city's ordinance failed the Smith rule because its
purpose was to prevent the plaintiff from building a house of worship in their city. Lukumi,
508 U.S. at 540.
73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
74. See infra notes 78-79.
75. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 577.
77. Id. at 564 (Souter, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 562-63 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Therefore, Justice Souter argued, a law only has to be "formally
neutral" to be Constitutional under the Smith rule. 79
Justice Souter further explained that the four justices who
denounced the Smith rule, by contrast, embraced "substantive
neutrality."80 These Justices believed that a law that is "neutral on its
face" may nonetheless violate the Free Exercise Clause if its
application burdens religiously motivated conduct. 81 This notion of
neutrality is more consistent with the Sherbert line of cases, since the
government would have to justify any law which burdens the free
exercise of religion, directly or indirectly, to satisfy a substantive
neutrality requirement. 82 Justice Souter therefore concluded that
because Smith "left those prior cases [decided under the Smith
standard] standing, we are left with a free exercise jurisprudence in
tension with itself, a tension that should be addressed... by
reexamining the Smith rule." 83
D. The Current Standard: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and
0 Centro
The Smith decision not only divided the U.S. Supreme Court,
but it was also met with considerable public criticism. 84 In response to
the public outcry against Smith, Congress passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) under its Section V enforcement
79. Id. at 562. Justice Souter explained how the Smith rule embraces formal neutrality in
the following statement:
Though Smith used the term "neutrality" without a modifier, the rule it
announced plainly assumes that free-exercise neutrality is of a formal sort.
Distinguishing between laws whose "object" is to prohibit religious
exercise and those that prohibit religious exercise as an "incidental effect,"
Smith placed only the former within reaches of the Free Exercise Clause;
the latter, laws that satisf formal neutrality, Smith would subject to no
free-exercise scrutiny at all, even when they prohibit religious exercise in
application.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 562 (Souter, J., concurring).
81. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
82. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (stating that any imposition on the
free exercise of religion requires a compelling justification); see also Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 235 n.22 (1972).
83. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 564 (Souter, J., concurring).
84. See Struggle to Define Religious Freedom is Never Finished, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1991, at 16 (stating that "about [fifty] civil rights and religious groups, such as the National
Assn. of Evangelicals .... the National Council of Churches,... and most Jewish groups"
went to Congress requesting it take measures to reverse the Smith decision).
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powers in the Fourteenth Amendment. 85 Congress enacted RFRA with
the stated purpose of "restor[ing] the compelling interest test as set
forth in [Sherbert].'86 Congress based RFRA on findings that "laws
'neutral' towards religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise."
87
RFRA's Constitutional legitimacy was first challenged in City
of Boerne v. Flores.88 In City of Boerne, St. Peter Catholic Church
challenged a city ordinance under RFRA that prevented it from
enlarging its church to accommodate a large influx of new
worshipers. 89 However, the Supreme Court held that Congress's power
"to enforce" under Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment is only
preventative or "remedial." 90 Furthermore, since most of the state laws
RFRA applied to were not motivated by bigotry, RFRA could not be
considered a preventative or remedial statute in compliance with
Section V.91 The Court, therefore, determined that Congress was not
"enforcing" the Free Exercise Clause through RFRA, but rather, trying
to invoke substantial changes to the protections granted by the
Clause. 92 The Court, therefore, invalidated RFRA as it applied to state
laws. 93 It left open, however, the possibility that RFRA could be
applied to federal laws.
94
85. GUNTHER, supra note 51, at 1499.
86. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000). To fulfill its
purpose, the RFRA states:
[The] Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability... [unless the] [g]overnment ... demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person--(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest .... A person whose
religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert
that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government.
Id. at §§ 2000bb-l(a)-(c).
87. Id. at § 2000bb(a)(2).
88. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
89. Id. at511-12.
90. Id. at 519 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
91. Id. at 529-36.
92. Id. at 519 ("Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot
be said to be enforcing the Clause.").
93. Id. at 535. The Supreme Court held that RFRA constituted an unconstitutional
attempt by Congress to replace the Court's interpretation of the Constitution with its own:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best
when each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the
proper actions and determinations of the other branches. When the Court
has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the
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The U.S. Supreme Court most recently upheld a RFRA claim
in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal.95 In
0 Centro, a Christian Spiritist sect sued the government for
intercepting a shipment of hallucinogenic tea, which the sect
commonly uses for sacramental purposes. 96 The tea's hallucinogenic
agent, hoasca (more generally referred to as DMT), is outlawed under
the federal Controlled Substance Act. 97
In many ways, the 0 Centro case is analogous to Smith in that
both involve a free exercise challenge to a criminal drug law. The
major distinguishing quality between the two cases is that Smith
involved a free exercise challenge to state criminal laws98 whereas 0
Centro involved a free exercise challenge to a federal criminal law.
99
Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. When the
political branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be
understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its
precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including
stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. RFRA was
designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one before us; but
as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which
must control.
See Id. (citations omitted).
94. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
424 n.1 (2006) ("As originally enacted, RFRA applied to States as well as the Federal
Government. In City of Boerne v. Flores, we held the application to States to be beyond
Congress' legislative authority under [Section V] of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.") (citations
omitted); see also Jama v. United States INS, 343 F. Supp.2d 338, 368 (D.N.J. 2004) ("Every
single other Circuit court that has squarely addressed the question, however, has held that
Boerne did not invalidate RFRA in its entirety, and that the statute remains valid as applied to
the federal government."); O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003)
("We have in the past left open the question whether the RFRA may be applied to the internal
operations of the national government ... today we join the other circuits and hold that it may
be so applied."); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores did not invalidate RFRA as applied to
federal law.").
95. 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006).
96. Id. at 423.
97. 21 U.S.C.S § 842 (LexisNexis 2007). Hoasca is also known as dimethyltryptamine,
or DMT, and appears on Schedule One of controlled substances outlawed by the Controlled
Substance Act. See id. at § 812.
98. See Employment Div., Dept. Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874
(1990) (involving a facial challenge to a number of Oregon criminal statutes which
"prohibit[ed] the knowing or intentional possession of a 'controlled substance'--such as
peyote-even if this controlled substance was used for sacramental purposes) (quoting Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4) (1987)).
99. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423
(involving a RFRA challenge to the federal Controlled Substances Act that outlawed the use
of the controlled substance DMT, which the plaintiff used for sacramental purposes).
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However, the unanimous 0 Centro Court utilized the standard set forth
in RFRA and held that the government needed to justify its
infringement on the plaintiff's free exercise rights under RFRA. °° In
doing so, Justice Roberts, in his first written opinion as the Chief
Justice, stated:
We have no cause to pretend that the task assigned by
Congress to the courts under RFRA is an easy
one .... But Congress has determined that courts
should strike sensible balances, pursuant to a
compelling interest test that requires the Government to
address the particular practice at issue. 
01
0 Centro marks a turning point in free exercise jurisprudence
as the Supreme Court expressly recognized that although RFRA's
balancing test can be more complicated than the Smith test, it is
nonetheless the correct legal standard, as set forth by Congress, to
assess federal law.
III. ANALYSIS: WHY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 0
CENTRO EXEMPTS CATHOLIC EMPLOYERS FROM THE TITLE VII
CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE MANDATE
The Smith decision created considerable tension in free
exercise jurisprudence. This section will analyze this tension and
address how it was largely related to a disagreement between the U.S.
Supreme Court Justices concerning the Free Exercise Clause's
neutrality requirement. Then, this section will illustrate how the
Supreme Court resolved this tension by unanimously upholding
RFRA's application to federal law in its 0 Centro decision. Finally,
this section will demonstrate how the PDA's contraceptive coverage
mandate substantially burdens Catholic employers' free exercise rights
under RFRA, and why Catholic employers should, consequently, be
exempt from any such mandate.
100. Id. at 439.
101. Id.
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A. The Importance of Defining "Neutrality" in Free Exercise
Jurisprudence
It is generally accepted that the Free Exercise Clause contains a
"requirement for governmental neutrality."' 0 2 However, the Supreme
Court Justices differ greatly in their determination of what kind of
"neutrality" is required by the Free Exercise Clause. 103 This section
analyzes the tension in free exercise jurisprudence created by the Smith
decision and defines the different notions of "neutrality" that underlie
this tension.
1. "Intolerable Tension" Resulting from Smith
For almost thirty years, the Sherbert balancing test was the
only standard of analysis in free exercise jurisprudence. The Smith
decision dramatically changed this area of the law, but it did not
overrule prior case law. Rather, the majority in Smith claimed its
decision was in accordance with prior Free Exercise Clause
precedence.10 4 Despite the majority's claim, the Smith rule is a
departure from the principles set forth in Sherbert, which subjected all
laws that burdened religious exercise, directly or indirectly, to a strict
scrutiny analysis. 10 5 Justice Souter stated that the Smith majority
created an intolerable tension in free exercise law by setting forth a
new rule that conflicted with prior free exercise precedent without
overruling those subsequent cases that conflicted with the new rule.1
0 6
This section will explore the tension created by the Smith decision by
comparing the conflicting interests between those Justices who support
the Smith rule and those who oppose it.
a. The Smith Majority: The Smith Rule is a "Permissible
Reading" of the Free Exercise Clause that Allows the
State to Enforce Its Laws More Effectively
The majority in Smith acknowledges that its interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause was simply a "permissible reading" of the
102. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 560 (1992)
(Souter, J., concurring) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).
103. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
104. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, at 879 ("Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with 'valid and neutral laws of
general applicability."') (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment)).
105. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
106. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 564 (Souter, J., concurring).
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First Amendment.10 7 The Smith majority did not argue, however, that
its reading of the Clause was the only permissible reading, or even that
it was the truest. Rather, the Smith majority simply argued that its new
standard was a more effective way for the Court to decide free exercise
claims while still staying within the bounds of the Constitution.
10 8
Although the standard set forth in Smith is dramatically
different from the balancing test used in the Sherbert line of cases, the
Smith majority did not overrule these subsequent decisions. 0 9 Rather,
most of the opinion is dedicated to reconciling the new standard with
past free exercise case law." 1 Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority
opinion in Smith, argued that every law that has been upheld over a
Free Exercise Clause challenge was neutral and generally
applicable. "'
107. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 ("It is a permissible reading of the text... to say that if
prohibiting the exercise of religion... is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not
been offended.") (emphasis added).
108. See id. at 885 ("The government's ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct. . . 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
government action on a religious objector's spiritual development."') (quoting Lying v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
109. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 573-74 (Souter, J., concurring).
110. See id. at 520-47. The majority's attempt to reconcile the Smith rule with past free
exercise precedent was most apparent in its analysis of Cantwell v. Connecticut, and
Wisconsin v. Yoder. See generally Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In both of these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a
neutral and generally applicable law because it indirectly burdened religious exercise. See
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
More specifically, in Cantwell, the Supreme Court invalidated the conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness who was arrested for "inciting a breach of the peace" while proselytizing
on a public street. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-07. The common law offense of inciting a breach
of the peace is neutral and generally applicable in compliance with Smith because its object is
not to restrict the defendant's free exercise of religion. Likewise in Yoder, the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of an Old Order Amish member who refused to comply with a
Wisconsin school attendance requirement because the requirement conflicted with the
defendant's "fundamental belief that salvation requires life ... separate and apart
from... worldly influence." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210, 219-29. Application of the Wisconsin
law would likely be upheld under Smith since burdening the Amish's religious exercise was
not the law's stated objective. See generally Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969).
Instead of overruling these cases, which seemingly conflict with the Smith rule, the
majority created an exception to the new standard for "hybrid" cases where the Free Exercise
Clause, in "conjunction with other Constitutional protections," is infringed. Smith, 494 U.S. at
881. Cantwell and Yoder involved-according to the Smith majority-violations of both the
defendants' free exercise right and their rights to speech and family. Id. Only in such a "hybrid
situation" may a free exercise claim overrule a neutral, generally applicable law. Id.
11. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-80 (listing the following cases where a neutral, generally
applicable law was sustained over an individual's Free Exercise Clause claim: Prince v. Mass.,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a mother could be prosecuted under child labor laws for
making her children dispense religious literature); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
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In reconciling the Smith rule with prior free exercise precedent,
the Supreme Court majority explained in greatest depth its decision in
United States v. Lee.112 In Lee, an Amish employer sought an
exemption from Social Security taxes on the grounds that the Amish
faith does not condone participation in government support
programs. 113 The Lee Court conceded that the petitioner's free exercise
rights were burdened by the tax, but nonetheless rejected his claim
holding that the country's tax system could not function properly if tax
payments had to conform to each individual's religious beliefs.1 4
The Smith majority went into such great detail explaining Lee
because it was the most analogous case. The Lee Court decided that
increased efficiency in the tax system was more important than an
individual's free exercise rights.1 15  Likewise, the Smith rules
significantly restricted the rights granted under the Free Exercise
Clause to limit its influence on lawmaking and, thus, increase legal
efficiency. 116 This is evidenced by Scalia's opinion that "the
government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct. .. 'cannot depend on measuring the effects
of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development."" 1 7 Therefore, in the interests of lessening the influx of
free exercise claims and increasing the efficiency of the American
judicial system, the Smith majority created a new rule." 8 Basing the
new rule on a "permissible reading" of the Free Exercise Clause, the
Smith majority significantly lowered the scrutiny applied to Free
Exercise challenges.
(upholding a Sunday-closing law against the claim that it burdened the religious practices of
individuals whose religions compelled them to refrain from work on Saturdays); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (holding that the military Selective Service System
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by conscripting persons who opposed a particular war
on religious grounds); and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (sustaining a
free exercise claim from an Amish employer seeking an exemption from collection and
payment of Social Security taxes on the grounds that the Amish faith prohibited participation
in governmental support programs)).
112. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
113. Id. at 255-57.
114. Id. at 260 ("The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their
religious belief.").
115. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
116. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
117. Id. at 885 (quoting Lying v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S.
439, 451 (1988)).
118. Seeid.at879.
119. Id. at 878.
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b. The Other Side of the Debate: The Smith Rule
Dramatically and Unnecessarily Departs From Settled
First Amendment Precedent
Those Supreme Court Justices who opposed the Smith rule
generally argued that such a restriction on First Amendment rights
directly and unnecessarily conflicted with the principles of stare
decisis. 12 More specifically, they argued that in setting forth the Smith
rule, the Supreme Court effectively discontinued the Sherbert
balancing test, which had been the standard in free exercise
jurisprudence for almost thirty years. 121  Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Smith is illustrative of this discontent. 122 She wrote that
in order to establish the Smith rule, the majority had to first "give a
strained reading of the First Amendment" and then "disregard [the
Court's] consistent application of free exercise doctrine to cases
involving generally applicable regulations that burden religious
conduct."' 2 This section explores the argument against the Smith rule
by analyzing the inconsistencies between the Smith decision and prior
free exercise jurisprudence.
While the First Amendment does not distinguish between laws
that are generally applicable and those that target specific religious
practices, it does not forbid such a distinction. 124 However, the
Supreme Court previously considered incorporating this distinction
into the Religion Clauses in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm 'n,125 and chose not to do so. In doing this, the Court reasoned
that such a distinction "has no basis in precedent" because it "relegates
a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of scrutiny."'
' 26
Therefore, such a First Amendment interpretation is inconsistent with
the way the Supreme Court had previously construed the
amendment. 
27
120. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (illustrating that the Sherbert
balancing test was first used in 1963 and was the only standard used in over a dozen free
exercise cases until Smith modified it in 1990). See generally Sherbert v. Veman, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
122. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. Id.
124. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'); see also supra notes 107-
119 and accompanying text (analyzing the argument that the Smith decision constitutes a
"permissible reading" of the First Amendment).
125. 480 U.S. 136, 137 (1987).
126. Id. at 141-42 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986).
127. But see Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1847) (imposing a distinction
between those laws which regulate religious belief and those which regulate religious
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The Smith decision also conflicts with the Supreme Court's
decisions in Cantwell'28 and Yoder. 129 The Smith majority tried to
justify this conflict by labeling Cantwell and Yoder as "hybrid"
cases. 30 However, Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion
in Smith that the Supreme Court's reference to "hybrid" cases is novel
terminology for the Court. 13 1 Furthermore, O'Connor argued that the
Cantwel1132 and Yoder 13 3 decisions yield no indications that they
would have been decided differently if other First Amendment rights
were not infringed. 134 Additionally, a hybrid exception to the Smith
rule is useless because there is little reason for a litigant to raise a free
exercise claim if he could obtain an exemption from the law under
another Constitutional provision.
The Smith majority also asserted that the Court abstained from
applying the Sherbert test in the years leading up to Smith.1
35
However, significant evidence suggests the contrary-namely that the
Sherbert test was, and still is, a "fundamental part of our First
Amendment doctrine."' 136 The Court repeatedly used the Sherbert
standard to decide free exercise claims in the decades leading up to
conduct-the latter being outside the scope of Free Exercise Clause scrutiny-despite the fact
that such a distinction is not in the First Amendment.).
128. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
129. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
Although the Smith decision is at odds with the Sherbert decision, the Smith majority did not
argue that Sherbert falls under the same "hybrid" exception that Cantwell and Yoder fall
under. Rather the Smith majority distinguished Sherbert because it involved a free exercise
challenge to the denial of unemployment compensation and not an "across-the-board
prohibition on a particular form of conduct." Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. The majority then held
the Sherbert standard inapplicable to latter form of prohibitions. Id. at 885. This also
distinguished Smith from other free-exercise challenges dealing with unemployment
compensation denials. See generally Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Com., 480 U.S. 136, 141
(1987).
130. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; see supra text accompanying
notes 109-111.
131. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Court endeavors to
escape from our decisions in Cantwell and Yoder by labeling them "hybrid" decisions ... but
there is no denying that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise Clause ....
(citations omitted).
132. Cantweil, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
133. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
134. Smith, 494 U.S. at 896-97. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 883 (majority opinion) ("In recent years we have abstained from applying the
Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all.").
136. Id. at 900 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
2008] TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW 219
Smith.'37 This includes a case that was decided only one year prior to
the Smith decision.' 38 The importance of the Sherbert test is also
evidenced by the subsequent enactment of the RFRA and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,139 both of which
curtail the effect of the Smith rule by reinstating the Sherbert
compelling interest test. 1
40
In analyzing the arguments for and against the Smith rule, one
might already see how differing notions concerning the Free Exercise
Clause's neutrality requirement underlie this debate. Those justices 41
who support the Smith rule feel that the government performs more
efficiently if the Free Exercise Clause had a more limited neutrality
requirement than that interpreted into the Clause by the Sherbert
Court. 142 They justify this restriction by arguing that their alternate
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is "permissible."'143 By
contrast, the Smith rule's critics argue that such a limited neutrality
requirement conflicts with stare decisis.'44 More specifically, they
argue that after Sherbert, the Court's practice was to hold that laws
137. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
138. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that the
appellant's denial of unemployment compensation benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause,
even though the appellant did not state that his membership in a particular religious sect forbid
him to be work on Sunday). It should be noted that this case involved the denial of
unemployment compensation and the Smith majority conceded that the Sherbert standard has
been recently used in such cases. Id.; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. However, there is no
indication by the Frazee Court that it would not have applied the Sherbert balancing test if the
case did not involve a denial of unemployment compensation. See Frazee, 489 U.S. 829.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (a)(1) (2000) (stating that "[n]o government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious
exercise" unless that burden is the least restrictive means of satisfying a compelling interest).
140. Id. (applying compelling scrutiny to land use ordinances that impose a substantial
burden on free exercise); 42 U.S.C. 2000bb (b)(1) (2000) (stating that the purpose of enacting
the RFRA statute was to "restore the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert] ....").
141. United States Supreme Court Justices O'Connor, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
all dissented from the Smith majority. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990).
142. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 578 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring, O'Conner, J., joining) ("I continue to believe that Smith was
wrongly decided, because it ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative
individual liberty and treated the Free Exercise Clause as no more than an antidiscrimination
principle."); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544-45 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("I remain of the view that Smith was wrongly decided, and I would use this case to reexamine
the Court's holding there."); see also Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993,999 (1990).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 107-119.
144. Laycock, supra note 142, at 999.
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enacted without a discriminatory purpose might, nonetheless, be
insufficiently neutral towards religion to satisfy First Amendment
scrutiny. 145 This debate over which notion of "neutrality" best satisfies
the purpose behind the Free Exercise Clause will be further analyzed
later in this paper. 146
2. Defining Neutrality: Formal vs. Substantive
To understand the tension resulting from Smith, one must
examine the differing notions of "neutrality" which underlie this
tension. As Justice Souter explained in Lukumi, while the majority in
Smith "assume[d] that free exercise neutrality is of the formal
sort[,] ... [t]he four Justices who rejected the Smith rule, by contrast,
read the Free Exercise Clause as embracing ... substantive
neutrality."'' 47 Justice Souter explained that these differing notions of
neutrality are at the heart of the tension that surrounds free exercise
jurisprudence and, therefore, should be addressed when "reexamining
the Smith rule," 148 This section will compare the two notions of formal
and substantive neutrality and discuss how each applies to the current
contraceptive coverage controversy.
a. Defining Formal Neutrality
The best-known definition of formal neutrality was written by
Professor Philip Kurland in 1961: "The [Religion Clauses] should be
read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion
as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together
as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to
confer a benefit or to impose a burden."'' 49 Kurland argued that the
government should not take religion into account when assessing a
law's potential effects on the public.' 50 He feared our laws would lose
their effectiveness if offenders were able to get around legal
enforcement by simply arguing that their illegal activity was due to a
145. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "[a] regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for
government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." (quoting Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972))).
146. See infra Part III.A.2.
147. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 562 (Souter, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 564 (Souter, J., concurring).
149. Phillip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L. REV. 1,
6 (1961). One should note, however, that Kurland's principle has only recently been termed
"formal neutrality" by Justice Souter and Douglas Laycock. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 561;
Laycock, supra note 142, at 1001. The principle used to be known as "Kurland's rule."
Laycock, supra note 142, at 999.
150. Kurland, supra note 149, at 5-6.
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conflict between the law and their personal conscience.151 Kurland
argued that in the interests of effective lawmaking, the Free Exercise
Clause should extend only to those laws whose objective is to
discriminate against a particular religious practice. 1
52
The majority opinion in Smith illustrates Kurkland's view of
"neutrality." One of the concerns of the Smith majority was the
difficulty of drafting and enforcing laws in this country due to its
religious diversity. 13 3 Justice Scalia explained that making "an
individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's
coincidence with his religious beliefs ... permitts] him, by virtue of
his beliefs 'to become a law unto himself.' 54 Thus, the Smith
majority exempted all laws lacking a discriminatory objective towards
religious practice from the Sherbert balancing test. As a result of this
ruling, lawmakers will not have to accommodate for the plethora of
religious beliefs their laws could potentially burden.
Formal neutrality has a number of advantages over other
notions of "neutrality." First, it is easy to apply. Evidence as to
whether lawmakers enacting legislation possess the requisite intent to
discriminate against religious practice either exists or does not exist.
Second, applying formal neutrality would significantly limit the
number of free exercise claims that are brought before the Court. Laws
are rarely enacted to discriminate against a religious belief.155
Furthermore, finding evidence that a law was passed with
discriminatory intent is often difficult, since many laws are passed
quickly leaving little, if any, legislative history. 5 6 Careful legislative
drafting can also easily disguise a discriminatory objective. 1Third,
there is an "apparent even-handedness" to formal neutrality that is
appealing. 5 8 Since all religious practices could not be accounted for
when drafting laws, there would be no legal exemptions that could
serve as encouragement for others to join a specific faith. 159
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Employment Div., Dept. Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888
(1990) (stating that "many laws will not meet the [Sherbert balancing] test" due to our
"society's diversity of religious beliefs .... ").
154. Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
155. Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[i]ndeed, few States would be so naive as to
enact a law directly prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such.").
156. Laycock, supra note 142, at 999.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ... ").
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Yet, until the Smith decision, courts and legal scholars had
almost universally rejected the notion of formal neutrality.' 60 Douglas
Laycock stated that the most prominent reason for its unpopularity was
due to its universal application that produces unexpected results.'
61
Laycock demonstrated this inconsistency with a historical example-
the National Prohibition Act (NPA). 162 The NPA forbade the sale or
consumption of alcohol, but exempted the use of sacramental wine. 163
However, assuming per arguendo that the NPA did not include this
sacramental wine exemption, then celebrating many religious
ceremonies such as the Eucharist, Seder, or the Sabbath would have
been a criminal offense under the statute.' 64 Despite this substantial
burden on important religious ceremonies, the statute would have been
formally neutral, unless it was proven that the law was passed to
discriminate against those religions which used sacramental wine.
Furthermore, without such proof of a discriminatory intent, the
statute would also be constitutional under Smith because the Smith rule
only requires formal neutrality.' 65 Before Smith, a neutral law could be
successfully challenged in court, but the majority in Smith embraced
the notion of formal neutrality. 166 Following Smith, exemptions that
were previously guaranteed by the First Amendment "are now a matter
of legislative grace."'
167
b. Defining Substantive Neutrality
Justice Souter and the four other Justices who rejected the
Smith rule' 68 did so because they interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
as embracing substantive neutrality. One often cited definition of
160. Laycock, supra note 142, at 1000.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1000-01.
163. See Prohibition of Intoxicating Beverages, ch. 85 § 6, 41 Stat. 305, 311 (1919).
164. Laycock, supra note 142, at 1000.
165. The Smith majority implied that it would only declare another prohibition law
unconstitutional if the law made clear that it was banning the use of sacramental wine for
religious purposes:
the 'exercise of religion' often involves not only belief and profession but
the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts ... participating in
sacramental use of bread and wine .... It would be true, we think.., that
a State would be 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought to
ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious
reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display.
Employment Div., Dept. Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 492 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
166. See supra text accompanying note 164.
167. Laycock, supra note 142, at 1001.
168. Justices O'Conner, Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Souter have all rejected the
Smith Rule. See Smith, 492 U.S. at 891.
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substantive neutrality comes from Douglas Laycock who stated: "The
[R]eligion [C]lauses require government to minimize the extent to
which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief,
practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance." '1 69 Laycock
explains that by minimizing encouragement, "religion is to be left as
wholly to private choice as anything can be."'
170
In other words, a law that is neutral on its face may nonetheless
unconstitutionally infringe upon an individual's free exercise rights if
it incidentally burdens that individual's religious practices. This notion
of neutrality is apparent in the Sherbert decision. 17 In Sherbert, the
Court held that it was immaterial whether the ordinance intentionally
discriminated against members of the petitioner's faith; it mattered
only that the ordinance, in effect, forced the petitioner to choose
between the law and her religion. 1
72
One disadvantage of substantive neutrality is the application
can be more complex than that of formal neutrality. While a law may
burden particular religiously motivated conduct, an exemption from
that same law may also violate substantive neutrality by encouraging
others to join that religion. For example, while the NPA may
significantly burden certain religions by outlawing their use of
sacramental wine, an exemption from that same law may encourage
others to practice that religion so they may legally drink alcohol.
Such encouragement is, arguably, not substantively neutral since it
would promote certain religious practices.' 74 Furthermore, the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause bars the government from
encouraging religion in such a manner.17 5 Accordingly, for a law to be
substantively neutral, a court must balance the potential burden that
the law imposes on religious exercise with any possible
encouragement a religious exemption to that law would create.
However, a substantive neutrality requirement can also be less
burdensome on a court than formal neutrality, since the intent of the
Legislature when enacting the legislation at issue is irrelevant under a
169. Laycock, supra note 142, at 1001.
170. Id. at 1002.
171. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
172. Id. ("The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits.., such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.").
173. Laycock, supra note 142, at 1003.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 168-169.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. 1 ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ... ").
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substantive neutrality standard. 176 Therefore, the Court does not have
to sift through evidence such as the text of the statute, legislative
history, and the circumstances surrounding the law's enactment to
determine whether a law is substantively neutral towards religious
exercise. 177 Additionally, by balancing the potential burdens that a law
imposes on religious activity with the potential benefits created by an
exemption, the application of substantive neutrality assures that the
Court's judgment will not directly lead to religious persecution. 178
B. Whether the 0 Centro Decision Constitutes a Significant Step
Towards Ending the Judicial Tension Resulting from Smith
Justice Souter stated in Lukumi that the Smith rule was so
"decidedly untypical" from past free exercise case law that it created
an "intolerable tension" in that area of the law. 179 Justice Souter went
on to say that this tension must "be resolved, consistently with the
principles of stare decisis, in a case in which the tension is presented
and its resolution is pivotal."'180 The Supreme Court's unanimous
decision in 0 Centro to uphold RFRA's application to federal laws
176. Under substantive neutrality all that matters is whether an exemption would
minimize the State's influence religious practice. See Laycock, supra note 142, at 1001-02.
Therefore, unlike under formal neutrality, encouraging or discouraging religious conduct does
not have to be a law's objective for it to not be substantively neutral.
177. The Court's decision in Lukumi provides a good example of how formal neutrality
can be an inefficient neutrality standard. Since the Supreme Court used the notion of formal
neutrality in Lukumi, it had to undergo a number of steps to determine whether it violated the
Free Exercise Clause. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993) ("if the object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation, the law is not neutral ....").
First the Court had to sift through the law's text to determine whether it discriminated
on its face. See id. at 533-42. It then had to examine statute's legislative history, and the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, to determine whether the object behind the
ordinance was neutral towards religion. Id. at 540-42. After this analysis, the Court had to
determine whether the ordinance was generally applicable. Id. at 542-46. Finally, after finding
that the ordinance was not neutral or generally applicable the Court then had to determine
whether it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 546-47. As will be
explained in greater detail later in this Article, this method is a needlessly long way to
determine whether a statute violates the Free Exercise Clause, and cuts against the Court's
interest in establishing the Smith rule to increase efficiency in the Judiciary. See infra text
accompanying notes 184-86.
178. Laycock, supra note 142, at 1003 (arguing that when applied to a prohibition law
which does not exempt sacramental wine, substantive neutrality gets the right answer through
balancing the law's burdens with an exemptions benefits, while "[f]ormal neutrality ... would
lead directly to religious persecution.").
179. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 564, 574 (Souter, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
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signifies the Court's new embrace of substantive neutrality and an end
to the tension created by Smith.
In enacting RFRA, Congress clearly demonstrated its desire
that the Court expand its formal interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause's neutrality requirement and require that laws be substantively
neutral towards religiously motivated conduct.' 8 ' This is most apparent
in RFRA's drafting as the clear language in the statute supports
substantive neutrality.' 82 Justice Souter stated that those Justices who
support substantive neutrality believe that a "law 'neutral on its
face' . . . may 'nonetheless offend [the Free Exercise Clause's]
requirement for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion."" 83 Furthermore, those Justices thought that
"free-exercise neutrality. . . 'require[s] the government to justify any
substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling
state interest."'' 184 RFRA similarly rejects the Smith rule 1 5 and
expressly states that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious
exercise."' 86 Furthermore, RFRA also reveals that Congress agrees
"governments should not substantially burden religious exercise
without compelling justification."' 87
Although RFRA was drafted in 1993, the Supreme Court did
not affirmatively recognize its constitutional validity until 0 Centro.
188
The Supreme Court has previously decided a RFRA claim only once
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000) (stating that the purpose of the statute was to "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened ... .
182. See infra text accompanying notes 190-95.
183. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 562-63 (quoting Employment Div., Dept. Human Resources of
Ore. of Ore. v. Smith, 492 U.S. 872, 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
184. Id. at 563 (quoting Employment Div., Dept. Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 492
U.S. 872, 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis in original).
185. Congress explained its preference for the compelling interest test over the standard
set forth in Smith by stating the following in the RFRA:
[I]n Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court virtually eliminated
the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral towards religion ... the compelling interest test
as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)-(5) (2000) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
186. 42 at § 2000bb(a)(2).
187. 42 at § 2000bb(a)(3).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101. See generally Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
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before in City of Boerne, when the Court held that RFRA could not be
applied to state laws as such an application is beyond Congress's
Section V powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. 89 Chief Justice
Roberts distinguished 0 Centro from City of Boerne early on by
stating that City of Boerne only held that RFRA's application to state
law is unconstitutional. 190 By contrast, a person whose religious
practices are substantially burdened by federal law "may assert that
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief' under RFRA. 19 1 By affirmatively recognizing
RFRA's constitutional validity when applied to federal law, the
Supreme Court in 0 Centro unanimously embraced the notion that
federal laws are only valid when they are substantively neutral.
Additionally, the language in Chief Justice Robert's opinion
suggests his support of the notion that laws, at least at the federal level,
must be substantively neutral to be valid. A law is considered
substantively neutral when it "minimize[s] the extent to which it either
encourages or discourages religious belief."192 To make sure of this,
courts must (1) "accommodate religious differences by exempting
religious practices from formally neutral laws;" ' 93 and (2) balance any
burden from the formally neutral law with any possibility that the
promotion of an exemption to that law would create. 194 In his role as
Chief Justice, Justice Roberts has embraced this burden on the courts.
He first accepted the idea in 0 Centro by stating that RFRA
"contemplates that courts would recognize exemptions" to formally
neutral laws, reiterating that this "is how the law works."', 95 He went
on to hold that the courts, on a case-by-case basis, are required to
"strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests."' 19 6 Justice Roberts concluded that "[w]e have
no cause to pretend that the task assigned by Congress to the courts
under RFRA is an easy one" but the Court is bound to "strike sensible
balances, pursuant to a compelling interest test."'
197
189. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94.
190. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 424 n.1. This decision was Chief Justice Roberts' first written
opinion.
191. Id. at 424 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I(c) (2000)).
192. Laycock, supra note 142, at 1001.
193. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 562 (1993) (Souter,
J., concurring).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 168-177.
195. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 434 (emphasis in original).
196. Id. at 439 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2000)).
197. Id. at 1225.
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It should also be noted that since City of Boerne, many states
have been passing "mini-RFRAs," which like the federal RFRA,
demand that their state laws be substantively neutral towards
religion. 98 A significant number of states enacted mini-RFRAs before
2006,199 stripping the Smith rule of much of its influence before the 0
Centro decision.200 Consequently, there was concern in the legal
community that some of the members of the Smith majority-in
particular Justice Scalia-would likely invalidate these mini-RFRAs to
preserve their interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.20 ' This
illustrates that the unanimous decision in 0 Centro to uphold RFRA's
application to federal law indicates that the Supreme Court is
beginning to embrace the notion of substantive neutrality.
By upholding the application of RFRA to federal law, the 0
Centro Court created the perfect compromise between the Justices
who supported the Smith decision and those who were against it. The
Justices who denounced the Smith rule did so largely because its
neutrality requirement was far more limiting than what the Supreme
Court had interpreted from the Free Exercise Clause in the past.
Because RFRA's purpose is to reinstate the standard set forth in
Sherbert, the Smith rule's critics should be satisfied that the 0 Centro
Court upheld RFRA's application to federal law. Additionally, since 0
Centro did not overturn the Smith decision, those who support the
Smith rule should be satisfied that their interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause's neutrality requirement will remain intact.
C. Whether a Religious Institution Can Obtain an Exemption from the
PDA by Virtue of a Successful RFRA Claim in Light of 0 Centro
In its 0 Centro decision, the Supreme Court outlined the
requirements for courts to issue an exemption to a Federal law under
198. As of 2005 the status of state RFRAs was as follows: "twelve states (AZ, CT, FL,
ID, IL, MO, NM, OK, PA, RI, SC, and TX) have enacted RFRAs by legislation; twelve states
(AK, IN, MA, ME, MI, MN, MT, NC, OH, VT, WA, and WI) have interpreted their state
constitutions to require strict scrutiny for accidental interferences with religion; one state (AL)
has implemented a RFRA by state constitutional amendment." Nicholas Nugent, Note,
Toward A RFRA That Works, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1052 n.146 (2008).
199. See, e.g., H.R. 4376 § 1, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997) (stating that "this act
shall be known ... as the 'Michigan religious freedom restoration act."'); Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. 110.003 (2007).
200. See supra text accompanying note 197.
201. See, e.g., Symposium: Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAw. L. REV.
501, 524 (2000).
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the RFRA.202 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
under RFRA by proving that the application of a federal law
203
imposes a substantial burden on a sincere religious exercise. 204 If a
plaintiff raises a prima facie RFRA claim, then the opposing party may
raise the affirmative defense that the "application of the burden to the
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
government interest. ' 2° 5 The repercussion of this decision is that
Catholic employers can raise a prima facie RFRA claim against the
PDA's contraceptive coverage mandate and that such employers
should be granted an exemption from the mandate, as it is not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
1. Catholic Institutions Can Raise a Prima Facie Case that the
Contraceptive Coverage Mandate Violates Its Rights
Under RFRA Despite the Law's Formal Neutrality
Given the precedence set forth in 0 Centro, courts will likely
recognize that the PDA's contraceptive coverage mandate
substantially burdens Catholic employers' free exercise rights in
206violation of RFRA. According to 0 Centro, a Catholic employer
will be exempted from the PDA's contraceptive coverage mandate if it
proves that the federal mandate imposes a substantial burden on one or
more of its sincere religious exercises. 207 Catholic employers will
likely meet this burden since the PDA mandate would require that
these employers pay for birth control, which the Catholic Church has
long deemed "intrinsically evil. ' 2 °8 Furthermore, 0 Centro and
RFRA's embrace of substantive neutrality renders moot any argument
202. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 434 ("RFRA, however, plainly contemplates that courts
would recognize exceptions-that is how the law works.") (emphasis in original).
203. See id. at 424 n. 1 ("As originally enacted, RFRA applied to States as well as the
Federal Government. In City of Boerne v. Flores, we held the application to States to be
beyond Congress' legislative authority under § 5 of the 14th Amendment.") (citations
omitted).
204. Id. at 428 (stating that claimant must prove application of a federal law "would (1)
substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise" to raise a prima facie case under
RFRA).
205. Id. at 424 (quoting Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)
(2000)).
206. Id. at 428, 430-31.
207. Id. (stating that claimant must prove application of a federal law "would (1)
substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise" to raise a prima facie case under
RFRA).
208. See infra text accompanying notes 219.
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that Title VII and the PDA are exempt from free exercise scrutiny
because they are formally neutral and generally applicable laws.2 °9
Catholic employers could raise a prima facie RFRA claim
against the PDA's contraceptive coverage mandate because the PDA is
a federal law that forces Catholic employers to pay for birth control,
which they have moral objections to. Considering the Catholic
Church's long-held position against birth control, the sincerity of its
moral objection is not to be doubted as it is rooted in the teachings of
the Catholic faith.210 The Catechism of the Catholic Church labels as
"intrinsically evil" any "action which, whether in anticipation of the
conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of its
natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to
render procreation impossible."
21
'
Furthermore, the Catholic Church has not changed its position
against birth control use despite growing opposition to its stance on
this issue. This is illustrated in Pope John Paul II's 1995 encyclical,
Evangelium Vitae, which stated that the "sacredness" and
"inviolability" of life requires that the Catholic Church continue its
moral opposition to birth control.21 2 Therefore, the Catholic Church's
position on birth control is not merely a standalone issue, but rather, an
important part of its overall commitment to the sanctity of life.2 13 Pope
John Paul II has also stated along these lines that "the right to life [is]
the most basic and fundamental right," and must be "defended with
maximum determination." 214 Therefore according to the teaching of
Catholicism, compelling Catholic employers to pay for birth control is
forcing them to disobey what is "most basic and fundamental" to their
religion.2
15
Despite this moral burden on Catholic employers, such
employers would not be exempt from the PDA's contraceptive
coverage mandate under the Smith rule due to the fact that Title VII
and the PDA are both formally neutral.216 Formal neutrality, according
209. See infra text accompanying notes 223-33.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 219-23.
211. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2370 (quoting PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE §
14 (July 25, 1968)).
212. POPE JOHN PAUL II, LETTER EvANGELIUM VITAE (1995).
213. Id.
214. Pope John Paul II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION CHR1STIFIELES LAICI,
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/apost-exhortations/documents/
hfjp-iiexh_30121988_christifideles-laici-en.html (last visited Sept 24, 2008).
215. Id.
216. The PDA's contraceptive coverage requirement is also not generally applicable
under the Smith rule because it does not selectively "impose burdens only on conduct
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to the Supreme Court decision in Lukumi, is determined by both the
text of the law and any evidence presented of a discriminatory
intent.217 Nothing in the plain language of either Title VII or the PDA
reveals a discriminatory intent. Neither statute mentions a specific
religion by name, nor do they list any specific religiously motivated
conduct.2 18 Additionally, Title VII and the PDA both apply equally to
all employers regardless of their religious affiliation.
Furthermore, there is no evidence supporting the assertion that
Congress's objective in passing the PDA was discriminating against
Catholic institutions. As previously stated, Title VII was enacted for
the purpose of ending "discrimination in employment and to place all
men and women, regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin,
on equal footing in how they were treated in the workforce." 219
Congress enacted the PDA in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's
motivated by religious belief ... " See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 543 (1993).
217. Id. at 533-43 ("To determine the object of a law, we must begin with its
text . . . '[t]he Court must [also] survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental
categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders."') (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n
of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2005), provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-()... to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex ... ; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2005).
The PDA provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise. This sub-section shall not require an
employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where
the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term, or except where medical complications have arisen from an
abortion: Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from
providing abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in
regard to abortion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000 e(k) (2005).
It is clear from the excerpts above that neither Title VII, nor the PDA discriminate on their
face.
219. See supra text accompanying note 26; see also infra Part Il.A..
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decision General Elec.22° because it agreed with the dissenting opinion
that classifications in a company health insurance plan which
"revolv[e] around pregnancy is ... at the minimum strongly 'sex
related.' 221 Clearly, unreasonable inferences from the justifications
that Title VII or the PDA were enacted to discriminate against
Catholic institutions would go beyond the purpose of the legislation.
Any extra burden on such institutions is merely incidental. Therefore,
the PDA is formally neutral despite the substantial burden that a
prescription contraceptive coverage requirement would impose on
Catholic institutions.
However, the 0 Centro Court recently accepted the idea that
formally neutral laws may nonetheless burden an individual's free
222exercise rights in violation of RFRA. Therefore, Catholic
institutions will not be denied an exemption from the PDA's
contraceptive coverage mandate simply because the PDA is formally
neutral. As a result, the courts will likely recognize that the mandate
places a substantial burden on Catholic employers because the
requirement is not substantively neutral.
A substantively neutral law minimizes the extent to which the
government encourages or discourages religious conduct. The PDA's
contraceptive coverage mandate, on the other hand, compels Catholic
employers to pay for birth control that the Catholic Church has
objected to for many years. Therefore, the PDA discourages Catholic
employers from practicing their faith by forcing them to choose
between compliance with State law or Church law.
Furthermore, an exemption from the PDA would not encourage
secular institutions to take up Catholicism in order to get around the
contraceptive coverage requirement because it is not in these
companies' best economic interests to do so. Studies consistently show
that it is more cost-effective for a company to cover the cost of its
employees' contraceptives since it will otherwise have to cover the
costs of those employees' unplanned pregnancies. 223 Compared to the
costs of labor, health care, and delivery for unplanned pregnancies, all
methods of prescription contraception are far more cost-effective. For
example, while the average annual cost of contraceptives per person is
220. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see also supra text accompanying
notes 30-32.
221. See supra text accompanying note 33.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 182-186.
223. See Cover My Pills, supra note 3 (follow "Facts" hyperlink); see also Sarah S.
Brown & Leon Eisenberg, THE BEST INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-
BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (1995); Trussell, The Economic Value of Contraception: A
Comparison of 15 Methods, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH No. 4 (April 1995).
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$480, the average annual medical cost incurred by a mother and her
infant-from pregnancy to birth-amounts to ten thousand dollars.
224
Furthermore, given the high rate of unintended pregnancies in the
United States, a health insurance plan only needs to increase its
members' use of contraceptives by fifteen percent to save enough
money to offset the cost of contraception for everyone in the plan.
225
It is ultimately in a company's best economic interests to cover
the cost of employees' contraceptives in its employee health plans.
The only institutions that would likely resist such coverage would be
those who have a true moral or religious objection to their use. It
follows that an exemption from the PDA would not encourage other
secular institutions to associate themselves with the Catholic Church
simply to avoid covering prescription contraceptives. Therefore, an
exemption from the PDA's contraceptive coverage mandate would
minimize the extent to which it encourages and discourages
Catholicism and make the statute substantively neutral. Both RFRA
and the 0 Centro decision embrace the need for federal laws to be
substantively neutral towards religion, 226 thus, the Courts will likely
recognize the substantial burden the PDA's contraceptive coverage
mandate has on Catholic employers. Consequently, Catholic
employers should have no problem raising a prima facie RFRA claim
against the mandate.
2. The PDA's Contraceptive Coverage Mandate Is Not
Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling State Interest
Since Catholic employers can raise a prima facie case that the
PDA's contraceptive coverage mandate violates their rights under
RFRA, they can only be denied an exemption from the mandate if its
burden on such employers is in furtherance of a compelling
government interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest. 227 A compelling government interest must be of the
"highest order" such that "only the greatest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." No
showing of merely a rational relationship to some colorable interest
will suffice.229 The Supreme Court has not yet formalized a test to
224. See Cover My Pills, supra note 3 (follow "Facts" hyperlink).
225. Id.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 179-201.
227. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424
(2006) (quoting Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I(b) (2005)).
228. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (citing
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
229. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
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determine which interests are compelling; rather the Court has
addressed each case on an ad hoc basis.
230
The PDA was enacted for the purpose of reducing gender
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in the workplace. 231 It does so
by expanding Title VII's definition of gender discrimination to include
unfair treatment of "women affected by pregnancy." 232 The Supreme
Court has not heard a case that addresses whether the State's interest in
reducing gender discrimination is sufficiently compelling to restrict an
individual's free exercise rights. It has, however, held that this interest
is sufficiently compelling to justify a restriction on an individual's
First Amendment right to free assembly. 233 Furthermore, the lower
courts have generally recognized that Title VII's purpose of
eradicating employment discrimination is a "compelling government
interest.' ' 234 Therefore, the Courts would likely find this interest
sufficiently compelling as to satisfy the first prong of the RFRA
standard.
However, even assuming that reducing gender discrimination is
sufficiently compelling to satisfy the first RFRA prong, Catholic
employers should still be exempt from the PDA's contraceptive
coverage mandate since the mandate is not narrowly tailored to serve
this interest. To demonstrate that a challenged application of a federal
law is narrowly tailored in compliance with RFRA, the challenging
party must demonstrate with "particularity how its admittedly strong
interest ... would be adversely affected by granting an exemption" to
the religious institution.23
5
An exemption from the PDA for Catholic institutions would
not inhibit its effectiveness in reducing gender discrimination because
230. Compare, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (holding that
unifying unemployment compensation rules to prevent fraudulent religious objections was not
a compelling interest), with United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982) (holding that the
unifying the collection of Social Security taxes was a compelling interest).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
233. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) ("Parties who seek to
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for that action."); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984) (holding that the state's interest in eliminating gender discrimination was sufficiently
compelling to justify infringement on the all-male Jaycees' First Amendment right to freedom
of association).
234. See, e.g., Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2004); Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists,
440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (E. D.N.Y. 2006); E.E.O.C. v. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 216 F. Supp.
2d 763, 810 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
235. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431
(2006) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972)).
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such an exemption would likely have a limited scope. First, only
Catholic employers would fall under the exemption since Catholicism
is the only religion that has labeled contraceptive use as a sin.
236
Second, a Catholic employer cannot act in opposition to his faith
unless he actively participates in the birth control use. Therefore, only
those Catholic employers who are actually paying for the birth control
can argue that the PDA infringes their RFRA rights. For example, an
individual Catholic executive at a secular institution cannot claim that
he has a RFRA right to deny his employees contraceptive coverage
unless he is the one paying for that coverage.
Third, unlike self-insured employee health plans, which are
governed exclusively by federal law, '237 fully-insured health plans are
subject to both federal and state law. 38 Therefore, fully-insured health
plans, such as those offered by Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs), must still cover contraceptives in states that have passed
mandatory contraceptive coverage laws since RFRA cannot be applied
to state statutes. 239 Twenty-six states (including New York, California,
Texas, and Illinois) have passed laws requiring fully-insured health
plans to cover contraceptive drugs and devices. 2. Additionally, twelve
states have full contraceptive coverage bills pending in their state
legislatures. 241 As a result of these state laws, a PDA exemption would
only affect employees that work at self-insured Catholic institutions
and those fully-insured Catholic institutions that are situated in the
minority of states that have not yet passed a state contraceptive
236. See infra text accompanying note 253.
237. ERISA preempts all self-insured plans from state law. See supra text accompanying
notes 4-7.
238. See generally Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67,
32 Cal.4th 527 (Cal. 2004) (holding that a fully-insured employee health plan must cover
contraceptives in compliance with California's Women's Contraceptive Equity Act).
239. The Supreme Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores that it was beyond Congress's
Section V enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to apply RFRA to state
statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
240. The following twenty-four states have enacted laws requiring full contraceptive
coverage: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The following six states have contraceptive equity
bills pending: Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Cover My
Pills, supra note 3 (follow "State Law" hyperlink).
241. The following six states have new contraceptive equity bills pending in 2007:
Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Id.
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coverage mandate.242 This constitutes a small number of institutions in
comparison to the vast number of organizations that must still comply
with the requirement. Catholic institutions should, therefore, be
exempted from the mandate.
IV. IMPACT: EXEMPTING CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS FROM THE PDA's
CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE MANDATE BEST SATISFIES PUBLIC POLICY
This Article has set forth the argument that Catholic
Institutions may successfully raise a RFRA claim and be exempt from
any PDA contraceptive coverage requirement. 24 3 While it seems most
apparent that such an exemption will significantly advance the
citizenry's religious autonomy rights, there are other public policy
reasons to grant such an exemption. This section purports to show how
exempting Catholic institutions from the PDA prevents what would
otherwise be religious persecution without significantly hindering the
State's interests in reducing gender discrimination.
A. Religious Institutions Would Likely Discontinue or Significantly
Restrict Their Prescription Health Care Plans If They Are Not
Exempted from the PDA
Catholic employers cannot cover their employees' prescription
contraceptives without committing what they feel is a fundamental sin
against the tenets of their religious faith.244 Therefore, Catholic
employers likely cannot provide prescription birth control to their
employers in compliance with the PDA and remain true to their
religious convictions and affiliation. To comply with the mandates of
their Catholic faith, religious institutions may be forced to discontinue,
or significantly restrict, the prescription health care plans available to
employees if unable to obtain an exemption.
The court in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.245 did not directly
mandate all employers to cover their employees' prescription
242. For more information concerning which states have passed state contraceptive
mandates see infra text accompanying notes 249-50. See also Cover My Pills, supra note 3
(follow "State Law" hyperlink). Moreover, the Catholic Church is the only major religion that
has labeled contraceptive use as "intrinsically evil." See infra text accompanying note 253.
Therefore, only those institutions who are associated with the Catholic Church can qualify for
an exemption, because a payment for contraceptives would only conflict with its belief
structure.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 216-240.
244. See supra text accompanying note 12.
245. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
2008]
236 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 8:199
contraceptives. 246 Rather, the Bartell court stated that an employer
cannot selectively exclude women-only benefits-such as prescription
birth control-from its prescription drug plan so that the resulting plan
unjustly benefits one gender more than the other.247 In other words, an
employer is only required to cover prescription birth control if its
current plan covers preventative treatment for medical conditions that
pose an equal or lesser health threat than pregnancy. 24 Therefore, a
religious employer who is unable to provide prescription contraceptive
coverage may avoid doing so by refusing to cover treatment for anY
medical condition that possesses a lesser health risk than pregnancy.
Since no legal authority has defined which medical conditions are less
threatening than pregnancy, such religious institutions will most likely
discontinue their prescription drug plans to assure compliance with the
PDA and avoid accusations of discrimination because of sex.
Although this would likely be the only option available to
Catholic employers, it certainly would not be appealing to the parties
on either side of this debate. It is the Catholic Church's position that
employers are morally obligated to consider the well-being of their
employees by paying them fair wages and benefits. ° However, when
forced to decide between satisfying its obligation to offer fair benefits,
and satisfying its obligation to not support contraceptive use, many
religious employers will choose the latter since prescription birth
control has been labeled by the Church as an intrinsic evil.251
Discontinuing prescription drug plans would put Catholic employers at
246. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
247. See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d. at 1272 ("[tlhe exclusion of women-only benefits
from a generally comprehensive prescription plan is sex discrimination under Title VII.").
248. See In re Union Pacific R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139,
1149 (D. Neb. 2005) ("[Defendant's] policy of excluding prescription
contraceptives ... violates ... the PDA, because it treats medical care women need to prevent
pregnancy less favorably than it treats medical care needed to prevent other medical
conditions that are no greater threat to employees' health than is pregnancy.").
249. The courts have held that those plans which exclude contraceptives-but cover other
medicines designed to prevent medical conditions which "pose an equal or lesser threat to
employees' health than does pregnancy"-are not in compliance with the PDA. See In re
Union Pacific R.R. Empl. Practices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1148-49 (D. Neb. 2005),
rev'd, 479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007). However, the courts have not defined what medical
conditions pose an equal or lesser threat to pregnancy. See, e.g., In re Union Pacific R.R.
Empl. Practices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1146 (D. Neb. 2005). Consequently, imposing
the PDA requirement on Catholic institutes may create a freezing effect on the ability of
Catholic institutions to offer employee health plans because they have been given no guidance
on how to draft plans which exclude contraceptives but are gender equal in compliance with
Title VII.
250. Stabile, supra note 2, at 773.
251. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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a significant competitive disadvantage: health benefits are an
important tool Catholic institutions use to attract competent employees
due to the fact that they are generally unable to offer high salaries. 252
Needless to say; an employer's discontinuance of prescription
health care would have a negative effect on all employees. It is
axiomatic that most female employees would prefer to receive a
generally comprehensive prescription drug plan that selectively
excludes prescription contraceptives, rather than no coverage at all.
This illustrates how the PDA burdens those it purports to help when
enforced against Catholic employers.
The discontinuance or significant restriction of prescription
health care plans at Catholic institutions is not socially desirable.
However, given the Catholic Church's stance against contraceptive
use, this is the only option for Catholic employers if they are denied an
exemption from the PDA. Therefore, such an exemption would benefit
both Catholic employers and their employees.
B. The Interest ofAdvancing Equal Treatment of Female Employees Is
Not Significantly Advanced by Denying Religious Employers an
Exemption from the PDA
The purpose behind the PDA's enactment-namely, reducing
gender discrimination in the workplace-is certainly a compelling
interest. 253 However, exempting Catholic employers from the PDA
contraceptive coverage requirement would not thwart the fulfillment of
this interest to the extent that it justifies infringing these employers'
free exercise rights.
Professor Sylvia Law, who wrote the leading article on the
PDA's contraceptive coverage mandate, stated three reasons why
excluding contraceptives from insurance coverage disproportionately
affects women:25 4 first, the exclusion of contraceptives from health
insurance plans increases the risk of unplanned pregnancies;255 second,
women "bear all of the physical risks and hassles" of obtaining
contraception because all "medically prescribed reversible methods of
contraception must be obtained and used by women;" 25 6 and third,
women pay a disproportionate share of out-of-pocket financial costs of
health care services "because employment-based insurance plans that
252. See Stabile supra note 2, at 774.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2005).
254. Law, supra note 8, at 364-74.
255. Id. at 364.
256. Id. at 374.
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ordinarily coverprescription drugs single out and exclude coverage for
contraception. ' ' 257 However, none of these arguments suggest that any
disproportionate impact on women would be solved by imposing this
contraceptive requirement on religious institutions.
With regard to Law's first argument, no evidence is presented
suggesting that most unplanned pregnancies are a direct result of an
employer's failure to cover prescription contraceptives.258 This lack of
evidence is especially pertinent to the issue of whether a Catholic
employer exemption from the PDA would inhibit the State's interest in
reducing gender discrimination. It is possible that some female
employees at Catholic institutions are of the same faith as their
employer and, therefore, might not choose use prescription
contraceptives even if their employer covered them. As a result, it is
difficult to argue that requiring Catholic institutions to cover
contraceptives would significantly decrease the rate of unintended
pregnancies.
With regard to Law's second argument, women will bear the
"risks and hassles" involved with obtaining contraceptives regardless
of whether their employers cover it.259 Furthermore, since many
Catholic employers will choose to discontinue their self-funded
insurance plans as a result of the PDA contraceptive coverage
mandate, 260 the risks and hassles involved with all pregnancy-related
medical conditions will be greatly enhanced if an exemption is denied.
With regard to Law's third argument, requiring religious
employers to cover their employees' prescription contraceptives would
not help decrease the current gender disparity in out-of-pocket medical
costs for two reasons. First, female employees can reduce the risk of
pregnancy and lower their out-of-pocket medical expenses by seeking
contraceptive coverage through their employer's HMO insurance plans
or by using alternative methods of birth control.26' Condoms, in
particular, can significantly reduce out-of-pocket medical expenses
since they are effective in preventing both unwanted pregnancy and
257. Id.
258. Stabile, supra note 2, at 768 n. 111. Stabile argued that
it is not enough to suggest that many unintended pregnancies occur among
women who do not use birth control. One must also demonstrate that
unintended pregnancies occur among employed women.., who did not
use prescription contraceptives but who would have used them if their
employer's plan covered them.
Id. (citations omitted).
259. See id. at 768.
260. See supra text accompanying note 243.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 239-240.
TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW
the transfer of sexually transmitted diseases. Second, since most
employees at Catholic institutions are also Catholic, it is reasonable to
assume that most female employees at these institutions are not
currently purchasing contraceptive drugs and devices. Therefore,
requiring religious employers to cover prescription birth control will
not significantly decrease the disparity in out-of-pocket medical
expenses.
While an exemption for Catholic employers would not
significantly inhibit the State's interests in enacting the PDA, the
denial of such an exemption would be devastating not only to the
Catholic Church, but to religious autonomy in general. In this way, the
0 Centro decision and RFRA significantly advance religious
autonomy, without significantly burdening the PDA's objectives.
V. CONCLUSION
The universal application of the PDA's contraceptive coverage
mandate should alarm every American regardless of his or her opinion
concerning the Catholic Church's stance on prescription birth control.
A federal law requiring Catholic institutions to pay for prescription
contraceptives would be one of the most significant burdens imposed
by the United States' government on religious autonomy in many
generations. Such application of the law should concern members of
all faiths. While few interests are more compelling than gender
equality, the State should not lose site of the freedoms bestowed in the
First Amendment to achieve this interest.
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